Shareholder Derivative Suits under the New North Carolina Business Corporations Act by Glatz, Robert W.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 68 | Number 6 Article 6
9-1-1990
Shareholder Derivative Suits under the New North
Carolina Business Corporations Act
Robert W. Glatz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Glatz, Shareholder Derivative Suits under the New North Carolina Business Corporations Act, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1091 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss6/6
Shareholder Derivative Suits Under the New North Carolina
Business Corporations Act
Shareholder derivative suits afford a means for enforcing corporate direc-
tors' fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Derivative suits allow a shareholder,
on behalf of a corporation, to attack wrongdoing by directors who could other-
wise avoid liability simply by voting as a board not to sue themselves.'
Because majority shareholders can control the board's activity directly by
their voting power, shareholder derivative suits are primarily a tool minority
shareholders can use to attack the activities of the corporation's directors.2
However, high litigation costs and the potential to recover attorneys' fees mean
that derivative suits are subject to use for strategic purposes which are fre-
quently not in the corporation's best interest. In the worst case, a derivative suit
is a frivolous claim to force a settlement benefitting only the plaintiff's attor-
neys.3 The fact that the corporation itself generally will bear the cost is no deter-
rent when the plaintiff has only a minimal ownership position in the
corporation.
4
In an attempt to balance these competing concerns, statutes creating the
authority to bring a shareholder derivative action also impose procedural re-
quirements to control abuse of derivative suits. 5 The difficulty for both statute
draftsmen and academic commentators is in deciding how restrictive the proce-
dural limitations should be to eliminate strike suits given that such restrictions
have the potential for obstructing meritorious suits. As a result of this trade-off,
one's opinion about a particular set of derivative suit procedures depends on
whether one views derivative suits as a valuable control on management or as a
source of strike suits.
6
In 1989 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a new set of proce-
dures to control shareholder derivative suits. These procedures are contained in
section 55-7-40 of the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act (New
Act).7 Although the section number under the New Act corresponds to that in
1. See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 271 (1986).
2. See id. at 271-73.
3. Id.
4. Id. See also Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney. The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
669, 671-77 (1986) (discussing the lack of incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants to serve the
corporation's interests).
5. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(a) (1990) (requiring contemporaneous ownership of
shares of plaintiffs in derivative proceedings).
6. Compare Fischel & Bradley, supra note 1 (attacking justification of derivative suits as a
means for investors to control management) with Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745 (1984) (discussing the deter-
rent and compensatory functional value of derivative suits).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40 (1990). Additional requirements are imposed by the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See, eg., N.C.R. Civ. P. 23(b) ("the complaint shall be verified
by oath").
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the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act),8 little else is taken
from the Model Act's derivative suit provisions.9 The New Act carries forward
all of the derivative suit provisions of the old North Carolina Business Corpora-
tion Act (Old Act).1° The General Assembly adopted several significant addi-
tions affecting where suit may be brought,II how suits may be dismissed, 12 and
attorney-client privilege,13 and provided supplemental requirements for "public
corporations". 
14
This Note analyzes the statute in four sections based on when the issues
arise in a derivative action. Part I examines the statutory requirements for initi-
ating a derivative suit under the New Act. Part II addresses the methods avail-
able to a corporation to dismiss a derivative suit brought in its name. Part III
focuses on the attorney-client privilege in derivative proceedings. Part IV dis-
cusses the barriers to bringing suit against a statutory public corporation. Provi-
sions carried forward from the Old Act are mentioned but the analysis focuses
on the significance of the new provisions. The Note concludes that the provision
for a court-appointed committee to consider dismissal is a progressive innova-
tion which could reduce litigation costs. The Note further concludes that the
provisions restricting actions against statutory public corporations do not distin-
guish between meritorious and strike suits and recommends that these provi-
sions be repealed.
I. INITIATION OF SUIT
Original jurisdiction over derivative suits is now vested exclusively in the
superior court.15 Although the official comments do not clarify how this provi-
sion should work, its sole purpose is to deprive the state district courts of juris-
diction, not to affect federal court jurisdiction.
16
8. RaV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40 (1984).
9. See id. The only derivative suit feature adopted from the Model Act is the authorization for
the court to grant a stay until any investigation initiated by the corporation is complete. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(b) (1990); RV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.40(b) (1984). In other
subject areas the North Carolina Corporation Act generally follows the Model Act. See generally
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1-01 to 55-17-05 (1990).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55 (1982) [hereinafter OLD
ACT] (replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40 (1990)).
11, See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(a) (1990); see also infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text
(discussing jurisdiction).
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(c) (1990); see also infra notes 31-84 and accompanying text
(discussing dismissal by special litigation or court-appointed committee).
13. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(h) (1990); see also infira notes 93-107 and accompanying
text (discussing attorney-client privilege in derivative suits).
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g) (1990); see also infra notes 125-39 and accompanying
text (discussing restrictions on bringing derivative suits against public corporations). A public cor-
poration is defined as "any corporation that has a class of shares registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. § 781)." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-40(18a)
(1990).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(a) (1990).
16. See General Statutes Commission Minutes, March 4, 1988, at 7. This provision originally
was drafted in the negative to avoid any implication that the drafters intended to preclude federal
jurisdiction but the Corporate Law Study Commission requested that it be refrained as it now ap-
pears because a state statute cannot deprive a federal court of its jurisdiction. Id.
1092 [Vol. 68
The New Act retains the Old Act's contemporaneous ownership rule which
requires a plaintiff to have been a shareholder at the time the action complained
of occurred. 17 This requirement is consistent with the Model Act, 18 federal pro-
cedure, 19 and the requirements of most other state statutes.2 0 This requirement
also is satisfied when a plaintiff's shares were received by operation of law from
a person who owned the shares at the time of the transaction giving rise to the
complaint.21 The almost universal requirement of contemporaneous ownership
is consistent with the general view of courts that allowing plaintiffs to buy law
suits by purchasing shares of stock facilitates strike suits.
2 2
The requirement for a demand on the board of directors also is carried
forward from the Old Act.2 3 This requirement closely resembles federal proce-
dure2 4 and the Model Act.25 North Carolina law does recognize an equitable
exception to the demand requirement when the directors in control of the corpo-
ration are primarily responsible for the alleged breaches of duty or are under the
control of those who caused the alleged breaches of duty.26 This exception is
based on the court's recognition that asking directors to sue themselves is fu-
tile.27 The New Act does not change the need to determine whether demand is
excused in any particular case. The court must still determine whether the
pleading states with sufficient particularity what demand was made or why it
was not made.
28
17. "An action... must allege, and it must appear, that each plaintiff was a shareholder or
holder of a beneficial interest in such shares at the time of the transaction of which he complains
." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(a) (1990) (previously OLD Acr, supra note 10, § 55-55(a)).
18. See REV. MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 7.40(a) (1984) ("A person may not commence a
proceeding... unless he was a shareholder of the corporation when the transaction complained of
occurred .... ").
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("the complaint shall... allege (1) that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains .... '2).
20. See D. DEMOIr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONs LAW & PRACTICE § 4:03 (1987).
Some states do make exceptions to the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See, eg., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 800(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989) (allowing court discretion to ignore the requirement).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(a) (1990) (previously OLD ACT, supra note 10, § 55-55(a)). ("or
that his shares or beneficial interest in such shares devolved upon him by operation of law from a
person who was a shareholder or holder of a beneficial interest in such shares at such time"). This
provision also is consistent with both the Model Act and federal procedure.
22. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949) ("The federal
court will not permit itself to be used to litigate a purchased grievance."). But see Harbrecht, The
Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1041, 1064
(1978) (arguing that requiring court approval of settlements and requiring the plaintiff to account to
the corporation for any proceeds insures only meritorious suits will be brought and that corporate
management will be improved by the actions of attorneys acting as private attorneys general).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(b) (1990) (based on OLD ACr, supra note 10, § 55-55(b)) ("The
complaint shall allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action
he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.").
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The federal rule also requires that the pleadings describe the
efforts made to obtain action from the shareholders, if necessary. Id.
25. REv. MODEL BusINs CORP. AcT § 7-40(b) (1984). No mention is made of demand on
the shareholders in the Model Act. Id.
26. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 471, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1987).
27. Id. ("In such case, the demand of a shareholder upon directors to sue themselves or their
principals would be futile and as such is not required for the maintenance of the action.").
28. See, e.g., Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 442, 80 S.E.2d 358, 361-62 (1954) (dis-
cussing application of demand requirement). Because there is no change in the law on this issue it
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The New Act grants the court authority to stay a derivative suit while the
board of directors investigates the allegations.2 9 Although this provision does
create the potential for delay tactics by management, it is available at the court's
discretion and should be used only to allow the directors an opportunity to de-
cide whether the corporation should pursue the claim directly.
30
II. DISMISSAL BY THE CORPORATION
The most controversial area of shareholder derivative suit procedures is the
ability of the corporation's board of directors to dismiss a suit after it is initiated.
Commonly, a corporation's board of directors responds to shareholder deriva-
tive suits by having a special committee of the board, composed of directors not
accused of any wrongdoing, investigate the claims and recommend to the court
that the action be dismissed as not in the corporation's best interest. 31 Courts
have struggled to define their role in assessing the recommendations of these
special litigation committees. 32 Although one court has questioned the author-
ity of a special litigation committee to dismiss a derivative suit against members
of the board, 33 the debate generally focuses on whether the court should show
deference to the committee's decision by applying the business judgment rule
34
or treat the recommendation as a conflict of interest situation and not apply the
business judgment rule.35 There is so much variation among courts on this issue
will not be considered further in this Note. For a critical discussion of the demand requirement see
Demott, Demand in Derivative Actions: Problems of Interpretation and Function, 19 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 461 (1986). For an evaluation of the Delaware demand-excused criteria see Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 814-17 (Del. 1984) (creating a high threshold requirement for a plaintiff to show
demand excused).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(b) (1990) ("Whether or not a demand for action was made, if
the corporation commences an investigation of the charges made in the demand or complaint, the
court may stay any proceeding until the investigation is completed.") This provision was copied
from section 7.40(b) of the Model Act. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes,
April 16, 1987, at 10-11.
30. Rnv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.40, official comments (1984) ("The purpose of this
stay is to preserve the right of the board of directors to consider whether or not to seek to enforce on
its own the corporation's claim.").
31. The Model Act provides that "a board of directors may create one or more committees and
appoint members of the board of directors to serve on them." REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr
§ 8.25(a) (1984). "Ejach committee may exercise the authority of the board of directors under
section 8.0l." Id. § 8.25(d). "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of
... its board of directors .... " Id. § 8.01(c).
32. See, eag., Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 468-69, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (1987) (discussing
three different approaches adopted by other jurisdictions).
33. See Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983)
(board members charged in litigation had no authority to empower committee to dismiss suit), But
cf Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) (interest taint of the majority of the
directors does not bar the board from delegating power to independent committee).
34. The business judgment rule requires a court to presume that directors have used reasonable
business judgment in exercising their duty of care. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CoRpORATioNs § 242 (3d ed. 1983).
35. Although the business judgment rule does not apply to conflict of interest situations, the
Model Act allows the transaction to be cleansed and the business judgment rule to be applied if "the
material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to the board of
directors or a committee of the board of directors and the... committee authorized, approved, or
ratified the transaction." REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.31(a)(1) (1984).
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that the drafters of the Model Act chose not to take a position.36
In Auerbach v. Bennett 37, for example, the New York Court of Appeals
applied the business judgment rule and concluded that the "determination of the
special litigation committee forecloses further judicial inquiry."' 38 Under the
Auerbach approach a court may only inquire into the disinterested independence
of the committee members39 and the committee procedures. 40 The Auerbach
court considered the individual interests of the committee members without dis-
cussing either the potential influence exerted by interested directors4 ' or inher-
ent structural bias.42 The court also stated that the special committee's
procedures would be improper only if they appeared to be a sham, which re-
quires a finding of either bad faith or fraud.43
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,44 the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a
less deferential approach to a motion by the corporation to dismiss a shareholder
derivative suit.45 Under the Zapata approach, a court must apply a two-step test
when considering a corporation's pretrial motion to dismiss.4 6 The first step is
an inquiry into "the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases
36. "The case law... is in a state of flux. For the present it should be permitted to continue to
develop." REV. MODEL BusNEss CORP. ACT § 7.40 official comments (1984) (citations omitted).
37. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). For a summary of the facts in
Auerbach see infra note 41.
38. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
39. Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. ("when individual members of a
board of directors prove to have personal interests which may conflict with the interests of the
corporation, such interested directors must be excluded").
40. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. ("While the court may properly
inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's investigative procedures and
methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of such factors trespass in the domain of
business judgment.").
41. See id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. In Auerbach four out of fifteen
board members were accused of wrongdoing. Id. The special litigation committee was made up of
three directors, none of whom were on the board at the time of the transaction complained of or had
any prior association with the corporation. Id. No mention is made of any previous relationships
with individual members of the board. Id.
42. See id. But cf. Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROnS., Summer 1985, at 83, 85-91
(discussion of social and psychological factors that create "structural bias" causing committee mem-
bers to be hostile to derivative suits against fellow directors).
43. Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 634-35, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
44. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). In Zapata the plaintiff initiated suit against ten officers and
directors for breaches of fiduciary duty. Id. at 780. Four years later, while the action was pending
and after four of the defendants had left the board, the corporation appointed two new directors,
created a litigation committee composed of the new directors, and moved to dismiss the action based
on the committee's investigation and recommendations. Id. at 780-81.
45. Id. at 779. This case has been the subject of numerous academic evaluations. See, eg.,
Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the
ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 982-90 (questioning the effectiveness of the Zapata approach);
Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: A Limitation on the Use of Delaware's Business Judgment
Rule in Stockholder Derivative Suits, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 80, 100-02 (1981) (praising Zapata as a
retreat from deference to litigation committees). The Zapata approach was adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALl) Corporate Governance Project. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986); see Seligman, A Sheep
in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 325, 372-76 (1987) (discussion of ALI approach to special litigation committees).
46. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. The motion must include a complete written record of the com-
mittee's investigation and findings and each side may make a record on the motion. Id. The burden
1990] 1095
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supporting its conclusions." 47 The business judgment rule does not apply and
the court will move to the second step only if it is satisfied "that the committee
was independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings and rec-
ommendations." s48 Under the second step, the court must decide if the motion
should be granted based on "its own independent business judgment."
49
Although Zapata provided a favorable environment for complaining share-
holders, it limited the application of the two-step test to demand-excused
cases.50 In cases where demand had been made and refused, the Zapata court
stated that it would respect the board's action unless it was "wrongful." 51 In
Aronson v. Lewis52 the Delaware Supreme Court made the practical implications
of this limitation clear.
Under Aronson, a court may conclude that demand is excused only if "a
reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and in-
dependent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment. ' 53 This requirement not only shifts the bur-
den of proof back to the plaintift 4 but, as applied to the facts in Aronson where
demand was not excused, it makes it almost impossible to have demand excused
when less than a majority of the directors approving the transaction are
interested.
55
The Supreme Court of Iowa took quite a different approach in Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc.5 6 The court held that directors who also were
parties in the action lacked the power to establish an independent special com-
mittee to dismiss the law suit.5 7 The rationale of the court's decision was that
is on the moving party to show "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to dismiss as a matter of law." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. But cf. supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (Auerbach court applying the business
judgment rule under similar conditions).
49. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789. "The Court of Chancery should, when appropriate, give special
consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests." Id.
50. Id. at 784.
51. "[A] board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as detrimental to the com-
pany, after demand has been made and refused, will be respected unless it was wrongful." Id. "The
board's decision falls under the 'business judgment rule.'" Id. at 784 n. 10.
52. 473 A.2d. 805 (Del. 1984). For a summary of the facts in Aronson see infra note 55.
53. Id. at 814. The standard for judging the exercise of business judgment is gross negligence.
Id. at 812.
54. The business judgment rule requires a presumption that directors have satisfied their re-
quired duty of care. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 34. Under Zapata, in interested
director transactions, "the directors, once the transaction is attacked, have the burden of establishing
its 'intrinsic fairness' to a court's careful scrutiny." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788 n.17,
55. In Aronson, the chairman of the board owned 47% of the outstanding stock and allegedly
selected all of the directors. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808-09. The board then approved a generous
employment contract which included payments for life and death benefits regardless of whether he
actually performed any services for the corporation. Id. The court held that the complaint did not
"factually particularize[] any circumstances of control and domination to overcome the presump-
tion of board independence, and thus render[ed] the demand futile." Id. at 817.
The Aronson demand futility test does not apply in cases where the corporation has taken a
neutral position on the litigation. Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 732 (Del.
1988). The board's "position of neutrality excuses Plaintiffs' failure to make demand." Id. at 731.
56. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
57. Id. at 718. In Miller, all four of the directors at the time of the transaction complained of
1096 [Vol. 68
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because the risk of "structural bias" is so great and difficult to demonstrate, a
"prophylactic" rule is required.5 8 As an alternative to board-appointed litigation
committees, the Miller court held that the corporation could apply to the court
for appointment of a "special panel" which would exercise the board of direc-
tors' power to investigate the complaint and recommend dismissal.5 9
The Virginia legislature has adopted by statute the concept of a court-ap-
pointed committee.co Unlike the Miller situation, there is nothing in Virginia
law to indicate that special litigation committees are unable to dismiss actions
without resort to the court-appointed committee. 61 Further, under the Virginia
approach, the court may appoint a committee at its own discretion, 62 while the
Miller approach envisions the committee appointment only at the corporation's
request.63 The Virginia statute clearly states that the court has the option to
include disinterested directors on the committee.64 Presumably, interested direc-
tors could not be appointed to the committee.
The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the problem of special litiga-
tion committees in Alford v. Shaw. 6 5 The Alford court adopted a Zapata-type
judicial scrutiny approach to special litigation committee recommendations with
one significant modification: there is no distinction in the review standard be-
were interested directors. Id. at 710. After the suit was initiated, the interested directors expanded
the board size to six and added two new directors to form an independent litigation committee. Id.
Based on this committee's recommendation, the corporation filed a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 711.
58. Id. at 718. "We conclude that we should prevent the potential for structural bias in some
cases by effectively limiting the powers of such directors in all cases." Id. See generally Cox &
Munsinger, supra note 42, at 83 (discussing the basis of structural bias). It is not clear what the
Miller court would have decided if less than a majority of the board was interested, because the
concerns with "structural bias" would still apply.
59. Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718. A dissenting judge expressed practical concerns about how the
trial judge would decide "whether to grant such an application, whom to appoint, and how to decide
such matters as who pays the panel... [and] [w]hat access will the panel have to internal corporate
records." Id. at 720-21 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
60. The Virginia statute provides that:
The court may appoint a committee composed of two or more disinterested directors or
other disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion to pursue a particular legal right or remedy. The committee shall report its findings to
the court. After considering the report and any other relevant evidence, the court shall
determine whether the proceeding should be continued or not.
VA. CODE ANN. 13.1-672(D) (1989).
61. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 804 (E.D. Va. 1982) (adopting
the Zapata approach as Virginia law and recognizing the power of a special litigation committee to
dismiss a suit).
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672(E) ("court may appoint a committee").
63. See Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718 ("a corporation may apply to the court for appointment of a
,special panel' ").
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672(D) ("disinterested directors or other disinterested persons").
65. 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). This case was actually the third in a series. In the
first case the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided to adopt the Miller prophylactic rule. Alford
v. Shaw (Alford I), 72 N.C. App. 537, 547, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985). The supreme court initially
reversed Alford I and adopted the Auerbach approach. Alford v. Shaw (Alford II), 318 N.C. 289,
307-08, 349 S.E.2d 41, 52 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 37-43 (discussing Auerbach
approach). The Supreme Court then withdrew this decision one year later. Alford v. Shaw, 320
N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). This Note will not discuss the earlier cases, but for a more com-
plete analysis see Cox, Observation - Heroes in the Law: Alford v. Shaw, 66 N.C.L. REV. 565
(1988).
1990]
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tween demand-excused and other cases. 66 Under Alford, before ruling on a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court must consider the committee report and
all other relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the defendants
will be able to show that the transaction was fair to the corporation. 67 Even if
the special litigation committee is found to be disinterested and independent, the
plaintiff may still prove that the committee members were not qualified to assess
the claim, that false information was supplied to the committee, or that "struc-
tural bias inherent in the use of board-appointed special litigation committees
...eviscerates plaintiffs' opportunities as minority shareholders to vindicate
their rights under North Carolina law."
'68
The court based its decision on the legislative policy of protecting minority
shareholders.69 The statute requires that derivative suits not be discontinued
before the court gives notice to any shareholders or creditors whose interests will
be "substantially affected by such discontinuance, dismissal, compromise or set-
tlement."'70 The Alford court stated that this determination requires a substan-
tive review of the litigation committee's report.
7 1
The New Act introduces a provision authorizing the use of a court-ap-
pointed committee to decide whether a derivative action is in the best interests of
the corporation. 72 The Drafting Committee's primary concern in adopting this
provision was the failure of special litigation committees to provide a cost effec-
tive means for corporations to dismiss derivative suits. 73 The Committee re-
jected a proposal to adopt the Auerbach review standard by statute so as to
66. Alford, 320 N.C. at 472, 358 S.E.2d at 327. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text
(discussing Zapata approach).
67. Id. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328. "[W]hen a stockholder in a derivative action seeks to estab-
lish self-dealing on the part of a majority of the board, the burden should be on those directors to
establish that the transactions complained of were just and reasonable to the corporation ...." Id.
68. Id. The Alford court stated that even if the plaintiff was likely to prevail, if "the amount of
the recovery would not be sufficient to outweigh the detriment to the corporation, the court could
still allow... dismissal." Id. at 471, 358 S.E.2d at 327. When read in conjunction with the board's
broad authority to indemnify directors and officers, this provides an efficient way for a corporation to
justify dismissal. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-57(a) (1990) (indemnification allowed unless party
knew or believed his actions were "clearly in conflict with the best interests of the corporation").
69. Alford, 320 N.C. at 470, 358 S.E.2d at 326.
70. Id. (quoting OLD AcT, supra note 10, § 55-55(c)). This provision is retained in the New
Act at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(d) (1990).
71. "To rely blindly on the report of a corporation-appointed committee... is to abdicate the
judicial duty to consider the interests of shareholders imposed by statute. This abdication is particu-
larly inappropriate.., where shareholders allege serious breaches of fiduciary duties owed to them
by directors controlling the corporation." Alford, 320 N.C. at 471, 358 S.E.2d at 327.
72. North Carolina's new provision, borrowed from the Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-672(D) (1989), reads:
Upon motion of the corporation, the court may appoint a committee composed of two or
more disinterested directors or other disinterested persons, acceptable to the corporation, to
determine whether it is in the best interests of the corporation to pursue a particular legal
right or remedy. The committee shall report its findings to the court. After considering
the report and any other relevant evidence, the court shall determine whether the proceed.
ing should be continued or not.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40 (c) (1990) (italicized phrases contained in North Carolina version but
not Virginia statute). See also Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, March 19,
1987, at 10 (adopting wording of Virginia statute for proposed New Act).
73. See Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, March 14, 1988, at 3. E.g.,
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 515 (Del. Ch. 1984) (attorneys' fees alone for the committee report
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invalidate the court's holding in Alford.74 The Committee also chose not to ad-
dress directly the costs of the court-appointed committee, assuming these would
be treated as court costs.
75
This history, combined with the express language of the statute, makes it
clear that the court-appointed committee provision is not a substitute for the
Alford approach but an alternative. Because both court- and board-appointed
committees are now available options, it is appropriate that the court-appointed
committee be established only on motion from the corporation.76 This protects
the corporation's right to exercise its own authority to appoint a committee and
prove its independence in court. Although the provision granting the corpora-
tion a veto over members of the court-appointed committee is troublesome,
7 7 it
is appropriate for two practical reasons. It gives corporations an incentive to use
the court-appointed committee rather than appointing its own committee,7 8 and
it establishes the corporation's role in selecting members of the committee.
79
cost $500,000), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985); Drafting Committee Minutes, March 14, 1988, at 3
(Professor Cox estimated the cost of the Alford report at $800,000).
74. The Committee adopted the provision primarily to reduce costs, not to deter strike suits.
Business Corporation Drafting Committee Minutes, March 14, 1988, at 3. The Drafting Committee
believed that the fee shifting provision in § 55-7-40(f) of the New Act would sufficiently deter strike
suits. Id. At the time of the committee's decision the provision was identical to the Virginia statute,
but the General Assembly adopted a modified version which provides a veto to the corporation. See
supra note 71 for the text of the provision as adopted. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43 for a
discussion of the Auerbach standard of review.
75. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, April 16, 1987, at 11. The court
could, under appropriate circumstances, require the plaintiff to pay the expenses under § 55-7-40(f).
76. An alternative which does not require a motion by the corporation may be the appointment
of a special master by the court under its inherent equitable authority. See, eg., In re Hardy, 294
N.C. 90, 104, 240 S.E.2d 367, 376 (1978) (Lake, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (special
master may be appointed by the court "to conduct an inquiry, which this Court, itself, could con-
duct, and make a report to this court."). While the statute does not make the court-appointed
committee provision exclusive, this is not the type of situation where a court typically would appoint
a special master. See, eg., In re Edwards, 243 N.C. 70, 71, 89 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1955) (per curiam)
(special master used in property settlement for an incompetent); Housing Authority v. Montgomery,
55 N.C. App. 422, 286 S.E.2d 114 (special master used in compensation determination in an eminent
domain proceeding), review denied, 305 N.C. 585, 292 S.E.2d 570 (1982).
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(c) (1990) ("committee composed of... disinterested per-
sons, acceptable to the corporation"). One concern is that this would allow the board to influence
the committee, but this possibility is unlikely because the court has the primary responsibility for
appointing the committee and the committee must report to the court, rather than to the board. See
id. The court may also refuse to appoint a committee. Id. A second concern is whether this affects
the level of deference the court will show to the committee's report. See infra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text (discussing proper role of court in review of committee report).
78. There is some risk that defendants will avoid use of the court-appointed committee, even
with the veto provision, out of fear that the committee will build the plaintiffs' case for them. This is
also good for plaintiffs because, under the special litigation committee approach, the committee al-
most always recommends dismissal and the result generally is an expensive court battle over the
independence of the committee rather than the merits of the suit. See supra note 72. This issue is
ideal for strike suits and creates an additional litigation problem which must be resolved before
addressing the merits of the claim in a legitimate suit.
79. Under Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983), the
practical problem of selecting committee members was not addressed. In complex litigation it would
be inappropriate to ignore totally the board's special expertise and resources in selecting members of
the court-appointed committee since, under Alford, the plaintiff is given the right to challenge a
committee's qualifications to assess complicated information. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 473,
358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (1987). There is little incentive for the board to abuse this authority because the
court retains the authority to consider the report "and any other relevant evidence" in deciding
whether to dismiss the suit. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(c) (1990). Any indication that the
10991990]
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The court's authority to appoint committee members80 gives it the opportunity
to address the "structural bias" concerns mentioned in Alford.81
The last issue implicated by the court-appointed committee provision is the
role the court will play in reviewing the committee's report. The court is not
bound by the committee's determination, but there is no reason for the court to
appoint a committee if it will still face the same problems raised in Alford in
assessing the board-appointed litigation committee's recommendation. To effec-
tuate this provision, the court should not appoint a committee unless it is willing
to give the committee a presumption of good faith and independence. This shifts
the burden of challenging the independence of the committee to the plaintiff.8 2
The plaintiff thus should challenge the independence of the board at the time of
its appointment rather than after the report is issued because the court is un-
likely to reverse its own determination that the board was independent. It is less
clear what impact this provision will have on the deference given to the substan-
tive contents of the committee's report.8 3 Although the court is free to exercise
its own judgment based on the report, for practical reasons, the court is likely to
show a great deal of deference to its own committee.
8 4
III. PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF ACTION
One area of academic dispute in shareholder derivative suits is the corpora-
tion's invocation of the attorney-client privilege to resist discovery requests
made by its shareholders.85 The danger in allowing a broad attorney-client privi-
lege in derivative suits is that it may disable the capacity of minority sharehold-
ers to prove legitimate grievances.
86
board was trying to control the committee could leave the corporation in the same position it would
have been in if it had used a board-appointed committee.
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(c) (1990).
81. See Alford, 320 N.C. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328. See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 42,
at 134 (committee "should not include any of the defendants' colleagues (past or prospective) or
even those likely to share a cultural identity with the defendants").
82. See supra note 54 discussing burden of proof under corporate motion to dismiss in a deriva-
tive action; cf Alford, 320 N.C. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328 ("burden should be upon [self-dealing]
directors to establish that the transactions complained of were just and reasonable").
83. Alford stressed the "judicial duty to consider the interests of shareholders impo3ed by the
statute." Alford, 320 N.C. at 471, 358 S.E.2d at 327.
84. See Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, March 14, 1988, at 3. This is
especially true in complex disputes where the court is already dependent on "expert" opinion in
exercising its independent judgment.
An additional factor favoring deference to the committee's recommendation is that the court's
reason for not showing deference in Alford was the statutory duty to consider shareholder interests.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. The current statute shows significantly less concern for
the rights of minority shareholders and more concern for creating barriers to derivative suits. See
infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
85. See D. DEMorT, supra note 20, § 4:15, at 140-43. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized and given an expansive scope to the right of a corporation to assert the attorney-client
privilege against third parties. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981) (adopting a
case by case factual approach to determining which employees could be considered clients for pur-
poses of the privilege rather than a "control group" test limiting the privilege to communications to
senior management).
86. See, eg., F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHtAREJIOLD-
ERS § 7.08 (2d ed. 1985).
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The federal courts have developed most of the case law addressing this'is-
sue. The leading case is Garner v. Wolfinbarger,8 7 in which a federal district
court held that the attorney-client privilege applies to shareholder derivative
suits. 88 However, the court recognized that in a suit claiming corporate action
inconsistent with shareholder interests, 89 the shareholders should have the op-
portunity to show good cause why the privilege should not apply to a specific
request.90 The court attempted to balance the adverse impact on attorney-client
disclosure and the interest of nonparty shareholders against the potential bene-
fits of correct disposal of the litigation that would result from making the infor-
mation available to those "for whom it is, at least in part, exercised." 9 1 In
subsequent cases, the federal courts have limited the Garner derivative suit ex-
ception by refusing to apply it to "communications exchanged between the party
alleged to have committed the offenses and an attorney acting in his professional
capacity to represent the party in proceedings involving the alleged offenses."
'92
In Swenson v. Thibaut93 the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to
allow a corporation to assert a claim of attorney-client privilege against com-
plaining shareholders in a derivative suit.94 The Swenson decision is, however,
distinct in its fact pattern. The corporation did not assert the privilege to avoid
discovery but to prevent a law firm that had previously worked for the corpora-
tion from representing the plaintiff shareholders in the derivative suit.95 The
Swenson court also based its holding on legal reasoning completely different
from that used by the federal courts. 96 Although the company was nominally
aligned as a defendant in the action, the court elected to treat the company as a
87. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. Id. at 1103-04.
89. The claim in Garner was based on an issuance and sale of stock and the plaintiffs' desire to
depose the attorney who had advised the corporation on the transaction. Id. at 1095-96. The attor-
ney in question had since joined the corporation and at the time of this suit was its president. Id.
90. Id. at 1103-04.
91. Id. at 1101. A variety of factors were considered relevant including:
the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent; the bona fides of
the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colora-
ble; the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and
the availability of it from other sources;... whether the communication related to past or
to prospective actions; whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation
itself ....
Id. at 1104.
92. In re LTV Secur. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 607 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The standard for avoiding
the attorney work-product privilege in derivative suits is the normal "substantial need/undue hard-
ship" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). See In re International Systems &
Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1982) (basis for the exception only exists where there
is "mutuality of interest" between management and shareholders).
93. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978), review denied, 296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 181
(1979).
94. Id. at 110-12, 250 S.E.2d at 300-01.
95. Id. at 82-87, 250 S.E.2d at 283-87. The law firm previously had been hired to determine the
company's compliance with North Carolina law in connection with an involuntary rehabilitation
action several years before. Id. The law firm's role in the rehabilitation was adverse to the individ-
ual defendants, as indicated by the court's refusal in the earlier action to allow the company to
change to different counsel. Id. at 110-12, 250 S.E.2d at 300-01.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91 for discussion of the federal court treatment of the
attorney-client privilege in shareholder derivative suits.
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plaintiff, and the company therefore lacked standing to assert the attorney-client
privilege or any other defenses on the merits.
9 7
The New Act includes a provision which assures the corporation in deriva-
tive suits the same attorney-client privilege it would have in actions against third
parties.9 8 Although this provision clearly overrules the unusual basis for the
Swenson decision, it would not require a different result on the distinct facts of
that case.99 Its primary effect is to eliminate the good-cause exception articu-
lated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger.1°° It is less clear whether the provision is
designed to facilitate attorney-client communications 01 or if it is simply one
more example of a statutory shift from concern for the rights of minority share-
holders to protection of management.
10 2
There is no evidence that application of the good-cause exception in the
North Carolina courts has had a chilling effect on the flow of information be-
tween attorneys and their corporate clients.103 In light of the narrow interpreta-
tion federal courts have given Garner, 104 the practical impact of this provision is
unlikely to advance the policy objectives of the attorney-client privilege. 105 By
97. Swenson, 39 N.C. App. at 101, 112, 250 S.E.2d at 294, 301.
98. In proceedings hereunder, no shareholder shall be entitled to obtain or have access to
any communication within the scope of the corporation's attorney-client privilege which
could not be obtained by or would not be accessible to a party in an action other than on
behalf of the corporation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(h) (1990).
99. Swenson did not directly involve "access to any communication," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-
40(h) (1990), but rather an attempt to disqualify the plaintiffs' attorney. See supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text.
100. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
101. This is a uniformly accepted objective. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981) (recognizing a broad attorney-client privilege for corporations); see also Saltzburg, Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 817, 835-44 (1984) (asserting that Garner failed to facilitate attorney-client communi-
cation); Note, The Shareholders'Derivative Claim Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 48 L, &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 199, 227 (arguing against any exception since it discourages
full and frank disclosure).
102. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 86, § 7.08. The old North Carolina Act put a
minority shareholder "'in a more favorable position to seek redress on behalf of his corporation for
wrongs allegedly done to it by the majority of shareholders, the directors and officers, or outside
third parties.'" Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 470, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1987) (quoting R. ROBIN-
SON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTMcE § 14-1 at 214 (3d ed. 1983)). See also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 (1990) (articles of incorporation may eliminate director liability unless
bad faith/improper personal benefit); § 55-6-30(a) (no preemptive rights unless elected in articles of
incorporation); § 55-7-28 (no cumulative voting unless provided in articles of incorporation); § 55-8-
57(a) (authority to indemnify directors in derivative actions unless director knew his activities were
"clearly in conflict with the best interests of the corporation"); § 55-11-03(e) (simple majority vote is
sufficient to approve merger or share exchange); § 55-13-02(b) (dissenters' rights exclusive remedy
unless "unlawful or fraudulent" action by directors).
103. In fact the Corporate Law Study Commission, rather than the Drafting Committee, intro-
duced this provision along with the restrictive provisions of § 55-7-40(g). General Statutes Commis-
sion inutes, June 3, 1988, at 6. The Drafting Committee actually expressed concern that the
provision unintentionally might "limit the availability to a corporation's management of material
falling within the corporation's attorney-client privilege." Business Corporation Act Drafting Com-
mittee Minutes, June 1, 1988, at 2.
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. The Swenson decision could have been overturned by recognizing the attorney-client privi-
lege without making it coextensive with actions brought by non-shareholders. See supra text accom-
panying note 97.
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creating an absolute rule, it does provide an opportunity for abuse, especially in
the close corporation context.10 6 In individual cases, a court still may turn to
other exceptions to avoid inequities.10 7 By preventing the courts from consider-
ing the unique relationships between shareholders and their corporation in de-
ciding when the attorney-client privilege should not apply, this statute
inadvertently may cause an overly broad interpretation of other exceptions to
the privilege. It would be unfortunate if courts expanded the general exceptions
to avoid inequities to minority shareholders. Such broad interpretation could
undercut the legitimate goals of the attorney-client privilege in other cases.
Two additional aspects of the shareholders' derivative action statute, both
carried forward from the Old Act, address important issues related to resolving
derivative suits. One provision requires court approval of derivative suit termi-
nation.10 8 Before approving termination, the court must decide if the interests of
any class of shareholders or creditors will be "substantially affected" and may
provide notice to any class so affected.10 9 These requirements are similar to
those in the Model Act. 110 The court approval provision ensures representation
of the corporation's best interests under circumstances when the plaintiffs could
be more concerned with their narrow interests or maximizing attorney fees.111
The new statute also retains the Old Act's provisions for awarding attor-
neys' fees both to successful plaintiffs1 2 and to successful defendants.113 The
106. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 86, § 7.08.
107. See Note, supra note 101, at 211-17, 227 (the existing joint-client, crime-fraud and fiduciary
duty exceptions to the attorney-client privilege provide sufficient flexibility and any derivative suit
exception will lead to uncertainty in application of the good-cause requirement).
108. "Such action shall not be discontinued, dismissed, compromised or settled without the ap-
proval of the court." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(d) (1990) (previously OLD ACT, supra note 10,
§ 55-55(c)).
109. If the court shall determine that the interest of the shareholders or any class or classes
thereof, or of the creditors of the corporation, will be substantially affected by such discon-
tinuance, dismissal, compromise or settlement, the court, in its discretion, may direct that
notice, by publication or otherwise, shall be given to such shareholders or creditors whose
interests it determines will be so affected.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(d) (1990) (previously OLD ACT, supra note 10, § 55-55(c)).
110. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.40(c) (1984). One difference is that when a class's
interest is substantially affected, the Model Act provides that the court "shall direct that notice be
given." Id. Another distinction is that the Model Act mentions only shareholders and not creditors.
Id.
Ill. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40, official comments (1984). ("This requirement
seems a natural consequence of the proposition that a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the class
of all shareholders and avoids many of the evils of the strike suit by preventing the individual share-
holder-plaintiff from settling privately with the defendants."). But see generally Coffee, supra note 4,
at 671-77 (discussing the lack of incentives for parties to serve the corporation's interests).
112. If the action on behalf of the corporation is successful, in whole or part, whether by
means of a compromise and settlement or by a judgment, the court may award the plaintiff
the reasonable expenses of maintaining the action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and
shall direct the plaintiff to account to the corporation for the remainder of any proceeds of
the action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(e) (1990) (previously OLD AcT, supra note 10, § 55-55(d)). See Lowder
v. All Star Mills, Inc., 82 N.C. App. 470, 346 S.E.2d 695 (1986) (applying the Old Act), cert denied,
320 N.C. 169, 357 S.E.2d 926 (1987).
The Model Act does not expressly provide for an award of fees to the plaintiff because the right
"is so universally recognized ... that specific reference was thought to be unnecessary." REv.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40, official comments (1984).
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Drafting Committee considered the provision for awarding defendants attorney
fees where plaintiffs brought actions "without reasonable cause" to be the pri-
mary deterrent to strike suits. 114 This provision does not affect the court's ability
to sanction either the defendants or the plaintiffs under Rule 11 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
115
IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
In the 1940's, under the impetus of the Wood Report, 116 many states
adopted "security for expense" statutes to control abuse of derivative proceed-
ings for strike suit purposes.1 17 These statutes allow the court to require plain-
tiffs to post a bond with the court to indemnify the corporation against any
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in successfully opposing the ac-
tion.118 The primary objective of these statutes was to discourage actions by
plaintiffs with only a limited interest in the corporation without discouraging
suits by plaintiffs who were more likely to represent the corporation's best inter-
ests.1 19 This aim was accomplished by allowing an exemption to the security
bond requirement when the plaintiffs represented more than five percent of the
corporation's stock.
120
During the 1960's, a new analysis effectively undercut the reasoning of the
Wood Report and security for expense statutes lost academic support. 121 Secur-
113. In any such action the court, upon final judgment and a finding that the action was
brought without reasonable cause, may require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to pay to the de-
fendant or defendants the reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by them
in defense of the action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(f) (1990) (previously OLD Acr, supra note 10, § 55-55(e)). See Lowder
v. Doby, 79 N.C. App. 501, 340 S.E.2d 487 (applying the Old Act), review denied, 316 N.C. 732, 345
S.E.2d 388 (1986).
114. See Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, April 11, 1988, at 3. The
Committee even considered making the fee shifting provision mandatory. Id.
115. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 also allows the court to sanction the attorney directly, but
the standard for an award of fees is presumably higher. Id. (court may certify "after reasonable
inquiry [that] it is well grounded in fact" and "not interposed for any improper purpose"). Even if
the standard was the same, a court is far more likely to exercise its discretion to award fees in a
context where the legislature has expressed a specific desire that it do so.
116. F. WooD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944)
[hereinafter WOOD REPORT].
117. The study included a survey of cases indicating that it was rare that anyone other than the
attorney benefited, and concluded that plaintiffs were not adequately representing the corporation's
interest because, in many cases, only a small percentage of shares was represented. WOOD REPORT,
supra note 116.
118. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g)(iii) (1990) (at court's discretion plaintiffs may be
required to post a bond to indemnify corporation for all expenses connected to the proceeding).
119. See WOOD REPORT, supra note 116, at 16-18.
120. See id. at 18.
121. See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suit" 23 Years' Experience, 4
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 50 (1968). A survey found that plaintiffs and their attorneys evaded the
statutes by a variety of techniques, including asserting federal claims to avoid the state security
statutes, intervention to satisfy the five percent requirement, or arranging to sue in a sister state
without a security for expense statute, either in that state's courts or in federal court using diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 59-64. See also Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negli-
gence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895, 901 n.21 (1972) (Wood Report analysis understates benefits of derivative
suits by categorizing all private settlements as nonbeneficial); Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical
Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit" Toward a Better Informed Debate, 48 L. & CONTEMP.
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ity for expense statutes now are used only in a minority of states. 122 The Revised
Model Business Corporation Act deleted the security for expense provision,
123
and the North Carolina legislature, after specifically considering the issue, also
chose not to include any such provision in the old Business Corporations Act. 124
The New Act Drafting Committee expressly rejected the security for ex-
pense statute which the General Assembly subsequently adopted. The Commit-
tee preferred to use the fee shifting provisions to deter strike suits. 125 The
Committee must have believed that security for expense provisions had failed to
have the desired deterrent effect, as indicated by the move away from these pro-
visions in other states.
126
Although the Drafting Committee did not support the security for expense
provision, the Corporate Law Study Commission added it to the New Act.
12 7
The Drafting Committee later modified the new provision by limiting its appli-
cation to "public corporations."' 128 The Senate Judiciary Committee amended
the provision to make imposition of the bond subject to the court's discretion. 129
In addition to requiring security for expenses, the "public corporation" sec-
tion also includes an unusual modification of the contemporaneous ownership
rule. To qualify as plaintiffs, shareholders must have owned shares of the corpo-
ration for a minimum of one year before bringing suit.130 This section also im-
poses a two-year statute of limitations on all derivative actions.
13 1
The special requirements in the public corporations section may lead to
PRORS., Summer 1985, at 83 (reviewing prior studies on derivative suits and recommending addi-
tional research to make up for the inadequacies of prior studies); Jones, An Empirical Examination
of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REv. 542 (1980)
(study indicating a significantly higher "success" rate in derivative actions than the Wood Report).
122. One author noted that as of 1987 only 19 states had security for expense statutes. See D.
DEMOTr, supra note 20, § 3:02. Most of these statutes follow the initial Model Business Corpora-
tion Act § 49, which provides an exemption if the plaintiffs hold more than five percent of the
outstanding shares of any class of stock of the corporation. Id.
123. See REV. MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 7.40 (1984).
124. OLD ACT, supra note 10, § 55-55. See R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 14-14 (3d ed. 1983).
125. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, April 11, 1988, at 2-3.
126. Id. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-123, official comment (1981) (legislature deleted the
security for expense provision). See also Note, supra note 121 (pointing to failure of security for
expense statutes to accomplish their objective).
127. General Statutes Commission Minutes, June 3, 1988. For text of the provision as adopted
see infra note 130.
128. Business Corporation Act Drafting Committee Minutes, January 9, 1989, at 9.
129. General Statutes Commission Minutes, May 5, 1989, at 13.
130. In addition to all other provisions of this section, any action brought on behalf of a
corporation that is a public corporation at the time of such action against one or more of its
directors for monetary damages the plaintiff or plaintiffs must (i) allege, and it must ap-
pear, that each plaintiff has been a shareholder or holder of a beneficial interest in shares of
the corporation for at least one year; (ii) bring the action within two years of the date of the
transaction of which he complains; and (iii) execute and deposit with the clerk a written
undertaking with sufficient surety, approved by the judge, in an amount to be fixed by the
judge to indemnify the corporation against any and all expenses expected to be incurred by
the corporation in connection with the proceeding, including those arising by way of in-
demnity, if the court in its discretion so requires.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g) (1990).
131. Id. § 55-7-40(g)(ii).
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forum shopping by plaintiffs. In most suits against public corporations, the
plaintiffs should be able to raise either a federal claim, allowing the action to be
brought in federal court,1 32 or sue in a sister state's courts133 where the corpora-
tion is subject to jurisdiction. As a result, rather than deterring shareholder
derivative suits, the statute may drive them to less convenient forums.
These three requirements establish barriers to derivative actions that are
totally unrelated to the merits of the cause of action. Although contemporane-
ous ownership assures that derivative suits cannot be bought, there is no reason
to believe that an additional year of ownership will make the plaintiffs less likely
to bring suit for improper purposes. The two-year statute of limitations on de-
rivative actions is significantly shorter than the statute of limitations which
would apply to the underlying action. 134 This constraint is incapable of discrimi-
nating between strike suits and legitimate grievances. The security for expense
statute fails to satisfy even the objectives of the discredited Wood Report, be-
cause the statute does not provide an exception for plaintiffs who hold a mini-
mum percentage of the corporation's stock. 13
5
The across-the-board deterrent potential of the security for expense provi-
sion 136 may go far beyond the burden of requiring posting of a bond in advance.
This section, unlike the fee-shifting provision, 137 does not articulate the standard
for awarding costs to the corporation from the security bond. In most states
with security for expense statutes, the corporation has recourse to the security
unless the plaintiff is successful in the litigation. 138 Hopefully, the courts will
read this provision in conjunction with the fee shifting provision and limit
awards to suits brought without reasonable cause. This result is not required,
however, because the security for expense provision applies only to public corpo-
rations and is available to the corporation and not to third party defendants. 139
132. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964). In Borak, a shareholder brought both
federal and state claims in the federal court. Id. at 430. The state claim was barred by state law
because the plaintiff had not satisfied the security bond requirement for bringing a shareholder deriv-
ative suit. Id. The court held that this presented no barrier to providing appropriate remedies on
the federal claim, even if state issues were involved. Id. at 434.
133. The security for expense provision of the corporation's state of incorporation would not be
relevant. Only the forum state's requirements would apply. See Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 130 F.
Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Ohio 1955). In a shareholder's derivative action on behalf of a Pennsylvania
corporation instituted in an Ohio court, the court noted that Ohio state courts would not apply the
Pennsylvania security bond requirement, nor would the federal court in a diversity suit. Id. Pre-
sumably this same logic would apply to the one-year share ownership requirement.
134. See, eg. Lowder v. All-Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, 239, 330 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1985)
(statute of limitations in shareholder derivative action depends on claim being asserted; it is ten years
in an action to impose a constructive trust for breach of a fiduciary duty), rev. denied, 320 N.C. 169,
357 S.E.2d 926 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-32(m) (1982) (three-year statute of limitations on
unlawful dividends or distributions); § 1-52(5) (1983) (three-year statute of limitations on torts); § I-
52(9) (1983) (three-year statute of limitations on fraud).
135. It therefore does not serve the Wood Report's objective of insuring that plaintiffs ade-
quately represent the corporation's best interests. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g)(iii) (1990).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(f) (1990) (fee-shifting allowed "on a finding that the action was
brought without reasonable cause").
138. See D. DEMOTr, supra note 20, § 3:02.
139. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g) (1990) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(f) (1990)




The new North Carolina derivative procedures carry forward the Old Act's
provisions relatively intact. The General Assembly has added three important
new provisions. One of the new provisions, allowing a court-appointed commit-
tee to recommend dismissal, attempts to reduce the costs of weeding out non-
meritorious suits. However, the other new provisions act as barriers to
derivative actions.
The provision for a court-appointed committee to consider dismissal of a
derivative action is a progressive attempt to address the high costs associated
with overcoming the directors' conflict of interest taint in many derivative ac-
tions. 140 It will serve the best interests of both plaintiffs and defendants by avoid-
ing much of the traditional litigation over the recommendations of board-
appointed litigation committees. 14 1 It also provides an opportunity to advance
the public policy interest in disposing of these actions by giving the court an
opportunity to appoint committee members in a manner which will overcome
the inherent structural bias found in special litigation committees. 142 This
should not only reduce the costs of derivative actions but also improve the rec-
ord of litigation committees in providing a fair hearing of minority shareholder
grievances. 
143
The practical impact of the second new provision, the attorney-client privi-
lege section, is less clear. 44 Because there is no indication of a significant prob-
lem with the privilege presently, combined with the narrow scope of the good-
cause exception developed by the federal courts in derivative suits and the avail-
ability of other exceptions to avoid inequity, this provision should have little
effect.145 It does, however, have the potential to introduce unjust results in spe-
cific cases, particularly in the close corporation context. Therefore, this provi-
sion should either be repealed or applied only to public corporations to allow
courts to continue handling specific situations on a case-by-case basis.
The third new provision, containing three restrictions on derivative actions
against public corporations, fails to discriminate between strike suits and legiti-
mate actions. 146 The principal result of these provisions may be to drive share-
holder derivative suits against public corporations out of North Carolina courts
limitation to the corporation and not to third party defendants may be rendered meaningless by the
indemnification provisions of the act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-57 (1990). The board can vote to
indemnify "directors, officers, employees, or agents against liability and expenses" in a derivative
action by "bylaws or by contract or resolution" unless he "believed" at the time the actions were
taken that they were "clearly in conflict with the best interests of the corporation." Id. For a public
corporation, a director's vote in favor of indemnification is not considered a conflict of interest trans-
action. Id. Taken in conjunction with the security for expense statutes provision including any
liability the corporation may have by way of indemnity, this statute would seem to cover all likely
third party defendants.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(c) (1990).
141. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 78.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(h) (1990).
145. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(g) (1990). See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
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and into either federal courts or sister state courts as plaintiffs seek to avoid the
restrictions. 147 The fee-shifting 148 and court-appointed committee provisions 14
9
along with the contemporaneous ownership requirement' 50 provide sufficient
safeguards against strike suits without creating unreasonable barriers to merito-
rious suits. The only positive aspect of the public corporation provision is that it
affects only the limited number of "public corporations" incorporated in North
Carolina. 15' This provision should be repealed, because the fee-shifting and
court-appointed committee provisions adequately resolve the problem of strike
suits.
ROBERT W. OLATZ
147. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(f) (1990).
149. Id § 55-7-40(c).
150. Id § 55-7-40(a).
151. While considering the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
9-05 (which also applies to public corporations), the Drafting Committee estimated that only about
two dozen companies would be affected, many of them banks and utilities which are also subject to
heavy federal regulation which provides additional opportunities to avoid bringing suit in state
court. Corporate Law Drafting Committee, Data Concerning Corporations Covered by the North
Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, March 30, 1988.
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